# THE STUDY OF MIND AND ITS FUNCTIONS

### The way in which Direct Perceiver apprehends its object

A direct perceiver is a **collective engager**, it engages its object in a collective manner because its object appears to it together with all of its uncommon characteristics. For instance, a direct perceiver apprehending a pot is a complete engager. Hence it comprehends a pot not from the viewpoint of merely eliminating non-pot, but **by way of a pot's aspect being cast just as it is.** A direct perceiver realizing pot does not comprehend its object by explicitly eliminating non-pot or anything else in order to understand pot. Rather, it realizes its object nakedly and directly. Beyond that, it is capable of realizing its object just as it is - that is to say, together with all of its uncommon characteristics. The "uncommon characteristics" of an impermanent phenomenon are those impermanent characteristics that are the same substantial entity in terms of being established, abiding and disintegrating simultaneously with that thing. These are phenomena such as the individual particles that compose a material phenomenon, the impermanence of the object, its productness, and so forth that are produced together with the object, and disintegrate simultaneously with the object.

It is explained that because the sense consciousness apprehending a pot is a complete engager, when the pot appears everything that is **one substantial entity of establishment and abiding** with the pot must appear. Futhermore, although the individual minute particles of a pot do not appear (as isolated particles) to that sense consciousness, it is not contradictory for numerous particles, which are many particles collected in a cohesive unit, to appear. For example, in order for a fist to appear it is necessary for a collection of five fingers to appear.

That the two, a pot and impermanence of a pot, are one substantial entity in the sense of undifferentiability of establishment and abiding means the following. The impermanence of the pot is produced, abides, and ceases simultaneously with pot; further, that which is pot's substantiality is also the substantiality of pot's impermanence, and that which is the substantiality of pot's impermanence is pot's substantiality. From that point of view, it cannot happen that one appears to a direct perceiver and the other does not. For this reason, pot also appear as impermanent to the sense consciousness apprehending it.

The table and the impermanence of table are not different substantial factors, they are indivisible. Similarly, the legs of the table are one substantiality with the table. You cannot separate out the parts of a table or the impermanence of table from table. When you see one you see the other. Subtle impermanence appears to the eye consciousness, although it is not ascertained. Nevertheless when you look at the coarse table you see its subtle impermanence. Pot and golden pot are one substantiality of establishment of establishment and abiding, but are not one substantiality of establishment and abiding in terms of place, time and nature. If they were, then there would have to be an appearance of golden pot whenever a pot appeared. But this does not occur because a silver or clay pot can appear without a golden pot appearing.

Specifically characterized phenomena have the character of appearing as they are, specifically, without depending on the appearance of a meaning generality. In the Sutra school, these are phenomena that are established by way of their own characters without depending on imputation by thought. Moreover, they appear together with all their own characteristics of impermanence and so forth without being generally characterized in a rough way by association with phenomena of other places, times, and natures.

Essentially, the meaning of that specifically characterized phenomena, impermanent phenomena, functioning things, and so forth are phenomena with respect to which place, time and nature are not mixed is that these

phenomena appear to direct perceivers nakedly, just as they are, without being at all mixed or confused with phenomena of other places, times or natures.

Product and impermanent thing do not appear differently to direct perception. For example, both product and impermanent thing appear to the ear consciousness that hears a sound. Direct perceivers are complete engagers that operate with respect to all the factors which are one substantiality of production and abiding with their appearing object. However direct perceivers are also involved in exclusion; for example, the direct perceiver realizing product also eliminates non-product. However, it is not sufficient merely to exclude "non-product" for a consciousness to be a partial engager. A consciousness which is a partial engager excludes all that is one substantiality of establishment and abiding with its appearing object except for the factor realized.

## The way in which Conceptual Thought apprehends its object

Thought consciousnesses are not collective engagers but **eliminative engagers**. Thought does not comprehend its object together with all of its uncommon characteristics, but understands its object in a general way by a negative process of eliminating all that is not that object.

The thought consciousness apprehending a pot does not comprehend a pot as it is, for it comprehends a mere mental imputation which is an elimination of non-pot. Such a thought consciousness explicitly ascertains a pot, but a pot is not its appearing object. The meaning-generality of pot is the appearing object, but it is not what the thought consciousness ascertains.

How is it that, if a child learns to identify a blue Toyota Altis as a car, he or she will be able to recognize a black Mercedes Benz as a car? What enables a person to generalize from one to the other? This is possible because the generic image of a car that was formed in the child's mind during the original identification applies equally to all cars. This generic image will be mixed with a mental image of a specific car - perhaps the blue Toyota Altis that was originally identified. Although the image is mixed with that of a specific car, because it also represents a factor which all cars possess, it serves as a means of identifying all instances of car.

Moreover, when one originally learned the name, the term "car" was affixed not to the specific Toyota of the moment, but to the mental image of a car which then allowed one to distinguish car from non-car. The generic image itself is an appearance as opposite from non-car, whereby it can serve to represent everything that is not a non-car - in other words, everything that is a car. Every car is an instance of opposite from non-car, and just as there are individual instances of cars, so there are individual instances of opposite-from-non-car. It is not that there is a single entity of opposite-from-non-car which pervades all individual cars.

It is important to know how conceptual thought operates. For example, a person who does not know the convention "pot" would, on seeing a golden bulbous thing to the east, asks, "What is this?", whereupon someone tells him, "This is a pot." At this time, there develops in the continuum of the one who hears this a thought consciousness which thinks, "This golden bulbous thing is a pot." This thought is induced by the expression "pot."

Because the golden bulbous thing appears as a pot in the perspective, or way of apprehension of this conceptual consciousness, it also appears as opposite from non-pot. This very appearance as opposite from non-pot is the meaning of the term pot. However, because that thought consciousness perceives it within mistaking the meaning-of-the-term to be a specifically characterized pot, it is said that for this thought consciousness the appearance (i.e. the actual pot) and the imputation (the appearance as opposite from non-pot) appear to be mixed as one.

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Here, "appearance" refers to the specifically characterized object (the actual pot), and "imputation" refers to the meaning of the term pot (the image of the pot - an appearance as opposite from non-pot). The thought consciousness thus perceives the meaning-of-the-term itself which is an appearance of a golden pot as opposite from non-pot, and for this reason a specifically characterized pot does not actually appear - only a meaning-of-the-term, which is the appearing object.

Therefore when this person sees a copper bulbous thing in the west, a thought consciousness thinking, "This is a pot" develops without any further need for relying on an appellation supplied by an informant. In terms of the appearance to this thought consciousness, all factors of being a pot which were earlier perceived in the golden pot in the east also appear to exist in the copper pot in the west. This is the way in which **place appears mixed to thought**.

It is not that for thought all the factors of a particular pot are mixed with all the factors of another pot. If this were so it would absurdly follow that the golden appeared red like the copper one. Thus, the "mixture of place" is that the pots in the east and west are mixed together in that they both appear as pot. This single appearance as pot seems to exist equally in the east and west.

Similarly, when one who has seen a golden pot in the morning sees a copper pot in the afternoon, all the factors of being a pot associated with the golden pot seen in the morning appear to a thought consciousness apprehending pot also to exist in the copper pot seen in the afternoon. This is how **time appears to be mixed to thought**.

For example, the innate apprehension of permanence is the misconception of earlier and later appearing to be mixed. Thus, it seems that the person you saw yesterday is the same as the one that appears today. In this way one conceives of phenomena as permanent or non-disintegrating.

Moreover, these two - the golden pot's factor of being a pot and the copper pot's factor of being a pot - appear to be one to a thought consciousness pot. This is how **nature appear to be mixed** to thought. Thought cannot distinguish between the factor of copper pot appearing as pot and the factor of golden pot appearing as a pot. These are in fact different, however, and they appear so to direct perception.

This thought consciousness apprehending a pot in which place, time and nature appear as mixed also perceives as unitary all the factors of being a pot in all manifestations of pot. "Manifestations of pot" is to be understood as "instances of pot."

Although both copper and golden pots are one entity with pot, golden and copper pots themselves are different substantial entities. Therefore, thought is mistaken in seeing these as one, for the pot which is a copper pot and the pot which is a golden pot are different substantial entities.

The factors which are the minute particles and moments of a pot do not actually appear to the thought consciousness apprehending pot. Rather, the meaning-of-the-term (which is the mental image) of the gross object – a collection of the particles of pot and of the continuum of former and later moments of pot - appear as pot. For example, when crossing a river, a man's shoe is carried away by water. Then, even though a long time has passed that man points a finger at the river and says, "This is the water that carried away my shoe." In fact, the continuum of water that carried away the shoe has passed, but such is said due to thought's adhering to the appearance of the meaning-of-the-term or generic image of the former and later parts of the water's continuum as one.

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The thought consciousness apprehending pot is a eliminative engager because it eliminates some qualities or factors related with the pot and engages with others. It does not realize all the factors - being a product, impermanence, and so forth - which are one substantiality of establishment and abiding with the pot.

A thought consciousness is a partial engager because it separates out, or isolates, factors contained within the same substantial entity and focuses on only one of them. Impermanence is not realized by a thought consciousness realizing product, and product is not realized by a thought consciousness realizing impermanence. Product and impermanent thing appear differently to thought.

The appearing object of a thought consciousness is necessarily a generally characterized phenomenon, a permanent phenomenon. Generally characterized phenomenon are so called because their characters are realized not by way of their own entities but by way of a generality. They are realized in a general way. For instance, the thought consciousness apprehending pot understands pot through the elimination of non-pot by way of its appearance of a mental image of something which is the opposite of non-pot. By this process pot is not understood together with all its specific qualities but merely in a general way, as the elimination of non-pot. Thus, a conceptual consciousness can know something in only a general way rather than appreciating its object's freshness and fullness.

The appearance which appears to the thought consciousness apprehending golden pot is the meaninggenerality of golden pot, not the actual golden pot. If it were the actual gold pot, then even if that gold pot were smashed with a hammer and then changed into another form, it would have to appear to thought just as it is i.e., in its new broken form and not as a gold pot; however, it does not appear so.

To put this another way, if that appearance to thought were the actual pot, the appearance would be able to perform functions such as holding water. If this were the case, then since wherever a thought consciousness apprehending pot exists a pot would also have to exist, no one would be bereft of a pot. Therefore, this thought consciousness is mistaken with respect to its appearing object because this appearance of gold pot as pot appears to it as a pot whereas it is not a pot.

The meaning-generality which is an appearance as opposite from non-pot to the thought consciousness apprehending pot is both a generality and a generally characterized phenomenon. All generalities are not necessarily generally characterized phenomena; for example, pot is a generality that is concomitant with all instances of pot, but pot is a specifically characterized phenomenon. The appearance as opposite from non-pot, however is a generally characterized phenomenon because it is permanent, and it is a generality because it has the nature of the external pot and the nature of the internal consciousness - the thought apprehending that meaning-generality or generic image.

However, a correct conceptual thought is not mistaken with regards to its determined object/conceived object because in the mode of apprehension of that thought consciousness there exist a conception thinking, "A golden pot is a pot," but there does not exist a conception wrongly thinking, "That appearance is a pot." For example, when one looks in the mirror wanting to discover whether or not there is grime on one's face, just that image in the mirror appears as the face and in dependence on this fact the condition of the face is understood, but there is usually no conception wrongly thinking, "That image itself is my face." In just the same way, the thought consciousness apprehending pot conceives pot by way of the appearance of an image of pot, but does not conceive the image of pot to be a pot.